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Abstract
While written by a proponent of realism, this article argues in favour of a pragmatic approach to 
evaluation. It argues that multiple sources of evidence collected using diverse research methods 
can be useful in conducting informative evaluations of programmes, practices and policies. It 
argues in particular that methods, even if their assumptions appear incommensurable with one 
another, should be chosen to meet the evidence needs of decision-makers. These evidence needs 
are captured in the acronym, EMMIE, which refers to Effect size, Mechanism, Moderator (or 
context), Implementation and Economic impact. Finally the article questions evidence hierarchies 
that are inspired by clinical trials, and suggests instead that, notwithstanding the clear differences 
in the physical and social worlds, engineering may provide a superior model for evaluators to try 
to emulate. And engineering is, above all, a pragmatic field.
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Introduction
This article embraces a realist orientation in evaluation, but its concerns are with the practical 
ways in which evaluation can best inform policy, practice and programme decision-making, 
even if this may sometimes involve departing from the realist ideal.
All programmes, policies and practices (PPPs) are concerned with improving existing states 
of affairs or patterns of behaviour or with averting unwanted future states of affairs or behav-
iours. Examples of states of affairs include morbidity and mortality rates, levels of unemploy-
ment, levels of literacy and numeracy, pollution levels, and the level and distribution of wealth. 
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Examples of behaviours include crimes committed, taxes paid, discrimination exercised on the 
basis of race, gender or sexual orientation, types of food eaten, and school attendance.
Unfortunately PPPs often fail. King and Crewe (2013) have recently produced an entertain-
ing if alarming catalogue of costly, major national policy flops in the UK during the quarter 
century leading up to 2010. These included, for example, the introduction of the poll tax, the 
formation of the Child Support Agency, the entry into and exit from the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism, the creation of the Millennium Dome, the operation of the Assets Recovery 
Agency, the single payments scheme for farmers, plans for National Identity Cards and sundry 
large-scale IT disasters. There is also no reason to believe that the UK is uniquely placed to 
produce policy and programme blunders.
Rational PPP decision-makers have an interest in reducing the risks of such failures and 
increasing the chances of success. Their wants lie in knowing what will produce which bene-
fits at what costs. This knowledge should help them achieve better outcomes by informing the 
allocation of scarce resources in ways that will maximize utility. This explains the concern to 
create, assemble and use what works evidence.
With a view to improving the evidence base for decision-makers, in March 2013 Britain’s 
Cabinet Office kick-started a series of ‘What Works Centres’ to draw together what works find-
ings to ‘help policymakers make informed judgments on investments in service that lead to 
impact and value for money for citizens’ (https://www.gov.uk/guidance/what-works-network, 
accessed 28 May 2015; for the background, see also Her Majesty’s Government 2012, 2013).
These What Works Centres covered, for example, health and social care, educational 
achievement, and crime reduction. Collectively the centres were intended to inform decision-
making over £200 billion of public expenditure.
Each centre was charged with collating existing evidence, producing high-quality synthe-
ses of evidence, assessing the effectiveness of policies and practices against an agreed set of 
outcomes, sharing findings in an accessible way and encouraging practitioners, commission-
ers and policymakers to use findings to inform their decisions.
One of the tasks of the What Works Centres has been to rate and rank available evidence 
for use by PPP decision-makers. This rating and ranking has become widespread and there is 
an appetite for criteria against which to score both primary studies and reviews of evaluation 
study findings. Those conventionally put at the top of the hierarchy are randomized controlled 
trials (RCTs), where threats to the internal validity of findings are allegedly eliminated by 
creating equivalent experimental and control groups by the blinded random allocation of sub-
jects to one or the other, blinded allocation of ‘real’ treatment to the experimental but not 
control group, and blinded comparison of changes in the two groups to ascertain the effect size 
(if any) of the intervention provided in the experimental group.1 This is deemed the ‘gold 
standard’. Other studies are then ranked according to how well they approximate the RCT 
ideal. Best of all are repeated RCTs of the same treatment.2 The results of suites of RCTs can 
be combined and the PPP presented with overall, highest and lowest effect sizes.3 If the inter-
vention is properly costed and the net benefits monetized then PPP decision-makers are pro-
vided with useful evidence on which to base their judgments. In this sense the evidence 
hierarchy seems to make good sense. PPP decision-makers want to know what to expect by 
way of impact, they want to know what it will cost and they want to know what the returns 
will be from different options.
The National Advisor for the network of What Works Centres, David Halpern, has stressed 
the virtues of the RCT as a vehicle for achieving improvement, suggesting that the successes 
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of the British cycling team provided a striking example of what could be achieved by a series 
of rigorous experiments testing the benefits from small changes (see Halpern, n.d.). Halpern 
also compared the rapid rate of expansion of health-focused RCTs with the relatively slow 
growth in those focused on social welfare, education, and crime and justice since 1900 (see 
also Syed, 2015). The What Works Centres have been focused on remedying the shortfall by 
assembling what there is already and helping to plug remaining gaps.
The next part of the article discusses the evidence needs of PPP decision-makers, which are 
not identical to their wants, and describes a method of rating that evidence: the ‘EMMIE’ 
scale. EMMIE was developed in the first instance specifically to apply to systematic reviews 
of evidence, hence to those forms of evidence that purport to be at the top of the evidence 
hierarchy, albeit that it is equally applicable to the assessment of individual evaluations aiming 
to inform PPP decision-makers. It will also be argued that it is relevant across the policy and 
practice waterfront, although it was initially devised specifically to relate to crime reduction.
For the purpose of this special issue of Evaluation, what is important is that EMMIE 
embraces a realist perspective with its stress on the formulation and testing of Context-
Mechanism-Outcome Pattern Configurations (CMOCs), but also acknowledges the practical 
importance of ‘black box’4 RCTs and quasi-experiments that are rooted in traditional Humean 
conceptions of causality, which refer to constant conjunction.
The latter part of this article suggests that engineering may provide a better framework for 
doing and delivering EMMIE-informed evaluations for social programmes than clinical trials, 
which are often used as the inspiration for the RCT ‘gold standard’.
What is common to the discussions both of EMMIE and engineering is the priority attached 
to trying to meet the practical needs of PPP decision-makers, even when this means incorpo-
rating research whose methodological assumptions appear to be incommensurable. In this 
sense the article aligns with Feyerabend’s slogan, ‘anything goes’, provided it contributes to 
progress (Feyerabend, 1975).
EMMIE and meeting PPP decision-maker evidence needs
We turn now to PPP decision-maker evidence needs rather than wants, which have been 
referred to so far. Needs here refer to the kinds of consideration that PPP decision-makers 
must take into account in determining what they will and will not do.
It is difficult to see how evaluation evidence of any sort could speak to some matters deci-
sion-makers often need to consider. These include, for instance, values, ideology and public 
opinion. Decisions-makers have to take account of public reactions to what might be done, to 
fundamental values such as those to do with human rights or equity, to legal constraints on 
what must, can and cannot be done and to sundry political imperatives that face them. Choices 
are always made from options that are in practice available, albeit that the range of these may 
be contested. Several of the policy blunders referred to earlier, as identified by King and 
Crewe, may be attributable to ideology and political expediency, which would trump evi-
dence-relevant considerations. This section, however, is concerned with PPP decision-maker 
needs that may be met by evaluation evidence.
The following specification of PPP evidence needs was developed as part of the 
Commissioned Partnership Programme in Support of the What Works Centre for Crime 
Reduction. This support programme was jointly funded by the ESRC and the College of 
Policing, which hosts the What Works Centre for Crime Reduction. One of the nine ‘work 
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packages’ required that, ‘a research design … be proposed to develop a comparative labeling 
scheme, using a consistent evaluation standard to rate and rank the effectiveness of interven-
tions and the overall cost-saving’ (College of Policing and ESRC, 2013: 11). EMMIE com-
prises the labeling scheme that was created (Johnson et al, 2015).
‘EMMIE’ was devised to try to capture PPP decision-maker evidence needs. It is an acro-
nym, where the two Es at either end refer to ‘Effect Size’ and ‘Economic consequences’. 
These are clearly interlinked in the sense that the effect size provides one of the crucial ele-
ments for estimating the benefits achieved or expected (although estimating costs is tricky and 
monetizing benefits even more so, see Manning et al, 2016). The two Es refer to the evidence 
wants as well as needs of PPP decision-makers. There are good reasons to pay attention to 
them. Resources are always limited and decisions have to be made about how to allocate them. 
Rational PPP decision-makers need to take account of what effects can be expected and what 
the costs and benefits of those effects will be, preferably in monetized terms that permit com-
parisons across policy and practice domains. Moreover as PPPs are expanded or shrunk those 
trying to make decisions about them need to know what the marginal effects will be in terms 
of outcomes, costs and benefits. While evaluators, notably those well-versed in realism, may 
be correct in emphasizing inevitable uncertainties that relate to human intentionality, the open-
ness of systems, and the diversity of changing contexts, it remains the case that for the rational 
PPP decision-maker best estimates of expected bottom-line net outcomes are important. This 
explains one of the attractions of the RCT and its closest practical counterparts: they offer an 
apparently hard-headed method for gauging outcomes.
RCTs and their quasi-experimental counterparts have therefore been commissioned and 
conducted to inform the evidence needs for the two Es. These methods of evaluation have, 
however, been little concerned with how interventions produce their effects. The intervention 
is thereby treated as a ‘black box’, where interest lies in what results from an intervention, 
rather than how its results are produced.
Coming to an informed view about expected effects and effect sizes and whether they 
warrant the expected costs of any PPP is, as indicated, sensible. Moreover, even if depend-
ency on past performance involves a logical leap of faith, some inkling of what might follow 
on the basis of what has gone before is preferable to a guess or mere wishful thinking. Most 
previous ranking systems have been based on the internal validity of individual studies and 
reviews in their estimation of effect sizes and cost savings. The link between those and 
RCTs is obvious.
The practical benefits of RCTs are most obvious in clinical trials. Using four examples 
relating to the treatment of diseases of blood vessels and breast cancer, Peto et al. (1995) show 
that large-scale RCTs (‘mega-trials’) with heterogeneous samples that are allocated to differ-
ent standard treatments (and/or no treatment) have been able reliably to identify small effects 
that hold the promise of informing treatment decisions that could prevent many deaths. 
Semmelweiss’ trials on handwashing saved the lives of many women and their children 
(Semmelweiss, 1983 [1860]); trials for thalidomide might have averted the suffering of the 
offspring of women who took it at the crucial period of their pregnancy (Brynner and Stephens, 
2001); and many women would have been spared the suffering from increasingly radical sur-
gery performed on those with breast cancer in the often fruitless efforts to cut out enough of 
their bodies to prevent it from spreading (Mukherjee, 2011).
One problem with such trials is that they always relate to the specific populations from 
which allocation to treatment/non-treatment or treatment variation is made. Strictly they 
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cannot be assumed to go for other populations in other places or at other times (see Cartwright, 
2007; Cartwright and Hardie, 2012). However, from time, space and population specific stud-
ies, ‘can work’ and ‘can cause harms’ inferences may sometimes validly be made (e.g. 
Semmelweis and handwashing, and Mukerjee and cancer), as can ‘may not always work’ 
inferences (e.g. Brynner and Stephens for thalidomide as a treatment and Mukherjee for treat-
ments of cancer). What cannot be concluded from a trial, however, is either that an interven-
tion ‘can never work’ or that it ‘will invariably work’, even though answers to such questions 
may be highly desirable for PPP decision-makers. As for evidence counting against a treat-
ment, it should be remembered that an RCT has not always been needed. It is sobering to 
remember that what did it for thalidomide was not a RCT but a clinician’s observations of 
aberrant rates of severe abnormality among babies of mothers in his care and publication of a 
fifteen-line letter on this in The Lancet (McBride, 1961).
PPP decision-makers may want simple effect size measurements and associated cost–ben-
efit estimations. Black box RCTs may seem to provide the answers. Unfortunately, however, 
although such RCTs are generally better than nothing in the evidence they furnish and can 
play an important part in improving some decisions about interventions, they are flawed as a 
sufficient basis for guidance.
Target heterogeneity means that the same intervention produces diverse and sometimes 
contradictory outcomes (see, for example, Davidoff, 2009; Kent et al, 2010; Peto et al, 1995; 
Rothwell, 2005a, 2005b5).6 Indeed, physicians advocating evidence-based medicine have 
recently become concerned that the overall effects reported in trials and meta-analyses of find-
ings may have led clinicians to disregard particular attributes of patients that indicate that the 
treatment that has been found to have an overall net benefit may not be appropriate for them 
and that informed clinical judgment is still needed (Greenhalgh et al, 2014). With an aging 
population where co-morbidity and multiple, possibly interacting treatments are applied, this 
issue is especially pressing.
Some of the practical limitations of past RCTs relating to social interventions have long 
been recognized even by doyens of the method and of meta-analyses of findings from system-
atic reviews prioritizing RCTs, as shown in the following statement from 1993:
The proper agenda for the next generation of treatment effectiveness research, for both primary and 
meta-analytic studies, is investigation into which treatment variants are most effective, the mediating 
causal processes through which they work, and the characteristics of recipients, providers, and 
settings that most influence their results. Such a research agenda is justified by a basic assumption 
that psychological treatment can be, and generally is, effective, so the questions of interest are not 
whether it works but how it can be made to work better. (Lipsey and Wilson, 1993: 1201)7
Lipsey and Wilson’s comments come at the end of a long review of studies that examine 
the effects of psychological treatment. They find some support for most treatments, but une-
quivocal support for few. This is typical of most interventions, which produce a mix of win-
ners, losers and those unaffected. Even with net positive or net negative findings across 
treated populations, some participants may have been affected but in the opposite way from 
the net impact. As Lipsey and Wilson suggest, progress can be achieved by refining under-
standing so that interventions are better designed and better targeted. This is important for 
PPP decision-makers who seldom start with a blank sheet and who are attempting to produce 
better states of affairs and behaviours than would otherwise occur (or cheaper achievement 
of similar states of affair or behaviours). It is that PPP refinement which requires research 
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evidence focused on ‘treatment variations’, ‘causal processes’ and the ‘characteristics of 
recipients, providers and settings that most influence results’. There is a clear affinity between 
this and the emphasis that realists place on mechanisms and contexts. It is this affinity that 
lies behind the two Ms of EMMIE.
The first M in EMMIE refers to ‘Mechanisms’ (or ‘Mediators’), the second ‘M’ to 
‘Moderators’ (or contexts). ‘Mechanisms’ clearly allude to the causal forces stressed in real-
ist evaluation and ‘mediators’ refer to the ‘causal processes’ (generally intervening varia-
bles) whose importance is emphasized by Lipsey and Wilson. Moderators refer to the 
variables sometimes used in statistical analysis to deal with effects variation in individual 
studies and across studies in meta-analysis, for example across study designs, recipients, 
providers or settings, while context is crucial to the realist’s understanding of the contingent 
activation (or deactivation) of causal mechanisms, due to their dependency on specific 
attributes of recipients, providers or settings (on this see Cartwright and Hardie, 2012; 
Pawson and Tilley, 1997).
Some realists may object that associating mediators with mechanisms and moderators with 
context fails to recognize or acknowledge the gulf between the ontological, epistemological 
and methodological assumptions that lie behind black box RCTs (and their quasi-experimental 
counterparts) and those that inform realist evaluations. RCTs have tended to assume constant 
conjunction accounts of causality rather than generative ones. Moderators and mediators have 
comprised efforts to come to more refined constant conjunction causal conclusions. For real-
ists, causality is generative and ‘mechanisms’ refer to generators that lie behind observable 
conjunctions. They depend on the activation of the causal potential from the intervention. That 
activation is contingent on sufficiently conducive conditions, which need to be specified. All 
that acknowledged, what matters for the PPP decision-maker is to understand that the produc-
tion of intended and unintended outcomes is dependent on the possibility that the intervention 
will lead to those outcomes and the conditions for the actual production of those outcomes. 
Moreover, they need to understand this at a level of abstraction that goes from past specifics 
to present specifics. For this they need to grasp how the intervention produces its outcomes 
and what is needed for that outcome-production to occur. Whether this is framed as mediators 
and moderators or mechanisms and contexts does not matter much for practical decisions, 
however much it might vex methodologists. The practical importance of Mechanisms and 
Moderators (MM) is highlighted in Tilley’s study of attempted replications of a successful 
burglary reduction programme, whose mechanisms and contexts were underspecified in the 
original study leading to substantial divergences in what was delivered in practice with conse-
quent unsurprising variations in outcome produced (Tilley, 1996)
The ‘I’ of EMMIE refers to ‘Implementation’. It is used here to refer to the conditions for 
putting the planned interventions into place as intended. Implementation is the focus of much 
process evaluation. Process evaluations are useful in understanding what is actually delivered 
and how this may come to depart (sometimes radically) from the policy, practice or pro-
gramme as formally conceived. For some programmes it is, of course, difficult to separate the 
implementation theory from the intervention theory. A case in point is the British Crime 
Reduction Programme whose realist assessment concluded that it was rooted in a web of erro-
neous context-mechanism-output/outcome assumptions (Tilley, 2004). Absent understanding 
what is involved in implementing a programme successfully, PPPs will be unable to emulate 
past successes. Moreover, negative outcome results from a trial may lead to the premature 
withdrawal of an intervention programme, whose failure was a consequence of some aspect of 
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implementation weakness, which is liable to occur in particular in embryonic programmes 
involving long causal chains and/or multiple interventions (see Campbell, 1984). The PPP 
decision-maker needs evidence on implementation in order both to interpret failure and to 
appreciate what is involved in delivering a given intervention.
The ‘E’ of EMMIE refers to economic consequences. The rational PPP decision-maker 
needs to take account of these and economists have tried to monetize costs and benefits, even 
where these relate to apparently incommensurate outcomes, in order to create a common unit 
of account for comparative resource allocation calculations (for the variety of forms of eco-
nomic evaluation see Manning et al, 2016). This has led some economists to be sympathetic 
to black box RCTs and efforts to emulate them as closely as possible where RCTs themselves 
are not practicable. Combined with conscientious and comprehensive costing, findings can 
feed into cost-effectiveness analyses (cost per unit of outcome or output) and estimations of 
effect sizes whose units might then be monetized and then compared to costs. The realists’ 
recognition that outcomes are variable and unstable clearly creates a challenge for this, but the 
practical need for estimating expected monetized outcomes from different resource allocation 
decisions is difficult to deny.
Thus, in summary EMMIE refers to Effect (size), Mechanism (or mediator), Moderator 
(or context), Implementation, and Economic consequences. These capture the crucial 
empirical evidence needs for PPP decision-making. PPP decision-makers need to know 
what, in their circumstances with their target populations, can be expected to produce which 
outcome patterns at what costs and with what expected benefits. They need also to know 
what is involved in the successful delivery of the interventions that can produce given out-
come patterns.
An EMMIE coding frame has been devised to rate and rank all systematic reviews of inter-
ventions attempting to reduce crime (Tompson et al, 2015). The results can be found at http://
whatworks.college.police.uk/toolkit/Pages/Toolkit.aspx, which scores 37 reviews in terms of 
the quality of evidence and findings relating to Effect, Mechanism, Moderator, Implementation 
and Economic Cost. It has been sobering to find how thin the evidence base is. Further reviews 
are being conducted with an EMMIE focus. It is clear that primary studies have not been 
designed to meet EMMIE needs and in that sense, if the foregoing arguments are correct, they 
are thereby of rather limited use to PPP decision-makers. Primary evaluation studies would 
better meet PPP decision-maker needs if framed in EMMIE terms. This, in turn, would mean 
that commissioners of evaluations would need to frame their invitations to tender or requests 
for proposals in those terms.
The second half of this article assumes EMMIE but suggests that a black box clinical trial 
model of evaluation evidence, where RCTs are taken as the gold standard, may not the best 
starting point if we are interested in EMMIE usefulness in our work. The argument is pre-
sented here as a cockshy to try to provoke some fresh thinking.
EMMIE and engineering
Much evaluation has focused on health-related interventions. More particularly, recent discus-
sions of evaluation standards have implicitly or explicitly used clinical trials as their source of 
a gold standard, albeit that that theoretical and empirical preparatory research that lies behind 
some clinical trials is often absent in other PPP domains. Medicine enjoys high status. The 
advances in medicine are obvious. It is unsurprising that there should be efforts to learn from 
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and emulate it. Although not originating in medicine, RCTs have become a taken-for-granted 
requirement for assessing and approving clinical treatments in medicine. Moreover, their limi-
tations in health-related research have often formed the crux of methodological debates in 
evaluation.
This part of the article will argue, however, that engineering may provide a more instructive 
model for evaluation that aims to serve those PPP evidence needs of decision-makers captured 
by EMMIE. Engineers, however, do not write much about methodology (but see Petroski, 
1982, 1996, 2008; Vincenti, 1990). They appear to be comfortable just doing it. And philoso-
phers of science have likewise paid little attention to engineering (but see Scharff and Dusek, 
2014 for a collection that shows some attention, but little to methodology). The reader is 
warned therefore that the following argument uses an understanding of engineering that is 
rather informal. It is derived in part from membership of the engineering faculty of a univer-
sity and in part from readings in the history of aeronautics and in the sociology of science and 
engineering.
Many engineers promote some particular technology, gismo or material that they have 
developed. They are exponents of the law of the hammer: they have developed their counterpart 
to the hammer and aspire to hit everyone and everything with it. They are not EMMIE engi-
neers. EMMIE engineers, instead, attempt to design, develop and create a physical, humanly 
constructed means for achieving an objective or an improved way of achieving that objective. 
When Popper (1957) referred to piecemeal social engineering he was talking about fashioning 
the social rather than the physical with the specific purpose of harm reduction.
Let us take aeronautical engineering as an example and reconstruct its methods. Orville and 
Wilbur Wright were, famously, the first to build a successful fixed wing airplane. They 
describe their methods (Wright, 1954), perhaps because they had no formal engineering train-
ing leading them to take for granted what they did. There has also been some effort to recon-
struct their methodology (Johnson-Laird, 2005, 2006).
The Wrights’ method differed from that used by those making earlier efforts at manned 
flight, whose approach seemed to be to have a bright idea and try it out.8 Many perished as a 
consequence. They were fatal casualties of the tests of their hypotheses. The first to try and die 
was apparently King Bladud in 850BC. It was close to 2000 years later in 1903 that the 
Wrights succeeded. Repeat efforts in the meantime might have led classic trialists to conclude 
than manned fixed wing flight does not work!9 But the Wrights still tried and eventually suc-
ceeded, subsequently dying of natural causes. How come?
The Wrights began by reading all they could find on flight. They wrote to the Smithsonian 
Institute to gather together the material and they read it critically. They also read and built on 
the work of Sir George Cayley (1773–1857), a prolific engineer and inventor who developed 
a theory of flight, calculating what would be needed for a fixed wing plane to fly, without put-
ting it to empirical test himself – he too died in his bed (Ackroyd, 2011). The Wright brothers 
worked out in detail what would be needed for flight according to the best theory they could 
find and they then subjected the crucial assumptions to empirical test. They even built a wind 
tunnel in the family bicycle manufacturing premises to test empirically the theoretically 
expected wing needs to achieve elevation. They developed a lightweight internal combustion 
engine that would produce sufficient power to deliver the output needed to drive the plane at 
a speed that relative to its weight and design would produce lift-off. They devised a design for 
propellers, based on analogous thinking related to (twisted) wings of birds (rather than propel-
lers uses in ships), which would create the required drive. Each element of the design and its 
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connection to other elements was worked through and tested separately. Some theory, for 
example, of the internal combustion engine, could more or less be taken for granted. All that 
which could not be taken for granted was articulated and tests undertaken before assembling 
the prototype which was again tested and tinkered with prior to the addition of a human, mini-
mizing the risk of loss of life. The prototype test still mattered, of course. The plane might still 
have fallen from the sky and Orville Wright, who piloted it, might have perished. The first 
successful fixed wing flight required no RCT!
Following the Wrights’ success the subsequent history of aeronautics has been one of 
attempted replication and then refinement after refinement, with a generally declining number 
of fatalities for test pilots. Figure 1 shows the clear trend in numbers killed.
Airplanes have become bigger, faster, safer and capable of greater distances between stops 
and thereby more cost-effective. This has not been achieved by RCTs or kindred trial designs. It 
has also involved trying whole new planes only after extensive testing of their components and 
near certain theoretical expectations that they will fly. 
The core curriculum of trainee aeronautical engineers is instructive. One example is shown in 
Figure 2 taken from Teeside University.10 It is clear from this that these engineers learn a lot of 
theory. Like the Wright brothers, modern aeronautical engineers also use a wide range of 
research methods including laboratory experiments, field trials, observations, simulations, 
thought experiments, historical comparisons etc. They do whatever is necessary to test and 
refine the working theories built into the airplanes being designed.
One general model for engineering methodology, drawn from Donald Campbell’s ideas on 
‘evolutionary epistemology’ (Campbell, 1974), has been referred to as ‘selection-variation’. 
This begins with a hypothetical general solution to a problem, which is often rooted in theory 
but may also come from experience or intuition. Crucially what follows are tests of multiple 
variations in the translation of that hypothetical solution into practice, using whatever methods 
are suitable to the issue at hand. What best survives these tests then feeds into further iterations 
of the problem-solution and further variations that are then tested. Vincenti illustrates this pro-
cess in the design and testing of profiles of airplane wings, where wind tunnels were used 
Figure 1. Trend in numbers of British test pilot fatalities: 1910.
Source: Calculated from data at http://www.thunder-and-lightnings.co.uk/memorial/index.php.
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(Vincenti, 1990: 16–50; 241–5011). Vincenti stresses than selecting possible solutions for test-
by-variation may involve ‘hidden mental activities’ that include searching ‘past experience for 
similar situations to find knowledge that has proved useful’, ‘conceptual incorporation of what-
ever novel features come to mind as called for by new circumstances’, and ‘mental winnowing 
of the conceived variations to pick out those most likely to work’. Not everything, thus, is tested 
empirically and the choice of what to vary and what to test is far from random, although always 
blind to outcome. To Campbell the variation-selection mechanisms lie at the heart of progress 
in science, social programmes and technology. In some cases RCTs may comprise one of tech-
nique for testing, but it is not the only one.12
Of course airplanes, as with all forms of engineering and social programming, are not infal-
lible. Many airplanes have fallen out of the sky and tragically it still happens. It is also the case 
that the modern aeronautical engineer has, perforce, to design to specifications that are ade-
quate to multifaceted contextual conditions, which, if ignored, would lead to flight failures. 
Distances between airports, length of runways, risks of highjacking, emission targets, noise 
targets, mentally unstable pilots, extreme weather conditions, structural strains on materials, 
hostile government threats, etc. all comprise constraints on design that provide conditions for 
flights to deliver their intended outcomes (Petroski, 1996). Engineering designs of all kinds 
are also always lodged in wider social and physical systems whose functioning is crucial to the 
engineering outcome. These relate not only to the obvious processes of construction and con-
trol, but also to enabling or disabling settings, such as transport systems, public health, com-
munications, maintenance, and access control (Petroski, 1996). Manifest failures lead to a 
form of diagnostic evaluation. What went wrong? Where was the theory built into the aircraft 
(or other engineering design) flawed?
Catastrophic failures of aircraft are by now rare and subject to detailed forensic examination. 
The crashes of the De Havilland Comets in Calcutta in May 1953, in Rome in January 1954 and 
Elba in April 1954 furnishes a useful example. Here was an airplane that had previously been 
reliable and safe, but crashes were now occurring. Where was the design flaw (Petroski, 1992)? 
Three crashes occurred before a common problem was identified. It is not easy to determine 
what caused a crash. As we saw with the Wright brothers, all airplanes are made of many cru-
cial components rooted in many theories. Large jet liners such as the Comet incorporate much 
theory including that of materials and the conditions under which they will fail.
Year 1 Year 2
Aerospace group design project Aero engines and rocket science
Electrical principles Aerospace group design and build project 
Engineering design and CAD Aircraft performance and stability
Engineering mathematics Aircraft structures and materials
Engineering thermodynamics and heat transfer Analytical techniques for engineers
Fluid mechanics Avionics and aerospace systems
Professional skills for aeronautical engineers Dynamic analysis
Properties of materials Engineering management and leadership skills
Structural mechanics
Figure 2. Core modules for year 1 and 2: Teeside BEng (Hons) Aerospace Engineering.
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The Comet was built to tolerances that exceeded the expected strains that might lead mate-
rials to fail. Early mooted explanations for the initial crashes invoked extreme and abnormal 
weather conditions and pilot error. The third crash led to the view that there must be some 
hidden intrinsic weakness that had led the plane to fail repeatedly. A series of hypotheses were 
proposed that would explain what changed conditions (context) had unexpectedly caused 
(activated or deactivated causal mechanisms) to produce the catastrophic crashes (outcome 
pattern). In the end, the hypothesis that prevailed was that the cabin of the Comet had exploded 
(established by reconstructing how an Indian Anna – a type of coin – had left its impression 
on the tail plane) following a structural fault at the corner of one of the windows, which was 
produced by the repeated pressurization and depressurization of the cabin.
This pressurization–depressurization hypothesis was accepted following an experiment 
that simulated the relevant processes. The experiment involved filling and emptying the fuse-
lage with water while flexing the wings with hydraulic jacks some 3000 times (Petroski, 1992: 
178). This led to cracks round the window. Differences in air pressure would then lead to an 
explosion if this occurred as the plane was actually flying. While the plane had been designed 
comfortably to withstand expected pressures the consequences of repeated pressurization and 
depressurization had not been anticipated. Once recognized the failures could, of course be 
remedied. Comets flew again and an important lesson was learned for aircraft designers.
A similar exercise in forensic assessment of failure followed the explosion of the Challenger 
space shuttle on the morning of 28 January 1986 after its launch from Cape Canaveral (Collins 
and Pinch, 1998). Here it turned out that rubber O rings in joints separating solid rocket boost-
ers were responsible. Unusually cold weather at the time of the launch had rendered these O 
rings brittle, leading them to crumble. Burning gases could then escape and this precipitated 
the disaster. On this occasion much recrimination followed the tragedy, with some suggestion 
that the problem could have been anticipated and remedial action taken. The O rings that were 
used had been tested with water in ways akin to those used in the Comet to test the pressuriza-
tion/depressurization hypothesis, but these did not simulate the extreme cold on 28 January 
1986. These and other tests were not, however, deemed adequate by some engineers at the 
time. Nevertheless the rings were used. Here the social context – pressure to launch – may 
have trumped precaution among key decision-makers leading to a failure to remedy a recog-
nized weak point in the design.
What emerges from Petroski’s writings on engineering design and engineering failure 
(Petroski, 1992, 1996, 2006) is that there are always realist (context-mechanism) theories, 
assumptions, trade-offs, compromises, uncertainties and economic factors at work in the 
design, development and delivery of products. He also presents engineering as a cumulative 
enterprise where past failures feed into improved future designs. In aeronautical engineering, 
for example, this is hard to miss. He emphasizes the imperfections of initial designs and the 
need for practical tinkering to iron out implementation problems: he cites the example of the 
Boeing 747, where 1000 lb of shims were needed to get bits of the fuselage to fit with one 
another - a problem now better dealt with computer aided design (Petroski, 1996).13 Finally, it 
is clear that engineering is highly pragmatic.14 The general lack of methodological self-aware-
ness is matched by a concern not with the truth or compatibility of high-level explanatory 
theory but the practical adequacy of theories in use, whatever the origins of the theories.
Most engineering is EMMIE compliant, at least implicitly. There is a primary concern 
with E (effectiveness): Did the airplane fly/not fly? There is a concern with MM (mecha-
nisms/mediators and moderators/contexts): What made the plane fly/crash in the prevailing 
conditions? What are the leading Context-Mechanisms-Outcome (CMO) hypotheses to be 
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tested? There is a concern with I (implementation): Was what was designed delivered and 
delivered consistently in practice? There is a concern with E (economy). Was the design 
delivered within budget and was the product more economical than its predecessor or next 
best alternative?
Moreover, engineering projects are comparable to PPPs. They comprise proposed new 
solutions or improved solutions to human problems (behaviours such as movement of people 
and products or states of affairs such as being too hot or cold or wet or dry). They are also fal-
lible. However, notwithstanding failures there has been cumulative development in engineer-
ing expertise, which is less evident in PPPs. This may have partly to do with the stuff of the 
social as against the physical stuff of engineering. Human intentionality, social meanings, long 
and concatenating chains of complexity and feedback from human action, and apparently 
greater variability and changeability in the social world and so on may mark the social from 
the physical and inhibit the progressive understanding and control achieved in engineering. 
While nature might shout ‘No’ in the physical world, diverse human beings may individually 
and collectively shout (or whisper) ‘No’ (or ‘Yes’) in the social world in the light of their 
sometimes fickle wants and understandings.
The difference between the social and the physical of engineering, however, are compa-
rable to those between the social and biological and the progress in engineering is of a 
similar kind to the progress in medicine. What matters here is whether the evaluation meth-
ods of engineering provide a better model for evaluation than those used in clinical trials 
and whether the consequent success and failure findings from engineering could be more 
useful to PPP decision-makers than success and failure findings from the methods used in 
clinical trials.
Here are two examples of realist evaluation and review that accord to some degree with the 
engineering model presented here, albeit that they lack that direct concern with practical 
improvement found in engineering.
First, Wong et al. report a realist review of possible legislation to ban smoking in vehicles 
carrying children (Wong et al, 2011). They identify eight threats to legislation as a public 
health measure targeting passive smoking: ‘problem misidentification, criminalization, com-
pensating behavior, lack of public support, lobby group opposition, obfuscating the new regu-
lations, low perceived threat of enforcement and insufficient enforcement resources.’ (Wong 
et al, 2011: 4). They were able to report on published evidence of various sorts that they were 
able to uncover in relation to four of them: problem misidentification, lack of public support, 
lobby group opposition, and enforcement (combining low perceived threat of enforcement 
and insufficient enforcement resources). Wong et al thus abstract and articulate the theories 
that are built into the legislation and the achievement of its aims and then cast around for evi-
dence that would speak to those theories. This is comparable to the efforts made by the Wright 
brothers to identify and test the theories they were able to prior to their first successful flight 
in 1903, albeit that the Wrights also undertook some experiments of their own where they 
found existing evidence absent or inadequate. They were also able to demonstrate in outcome 
terms the success of their preparatory work.
Second, in an article already referred to Tilley (2004) abstracted and articulated the theories 
that were built into the failed British Crime Reduction Programme (CRP) in a realist forensic 
examination of its failure. He contrasted the ‘supposed to do’ theory with the ways in which 
the programme had actually played out, drawing out findings to a level of abstraction that 
speaks to kindred large-scale programmes and which explains how they often fail.
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Neither of these realist evaluation studies articulated all the CMO theories that were built into 
the policy and programme examined. Many of the theories could properly be taken for granted. 
Instead, the studies abstracted that theory where weak points seemed most likely and where 
those weaknesses could jeopardize a successful outcome. In engineering and PPP decision-mak-
ing, spotting the weakest points in the underlying CMO theory is clearly going to make the big-
gest contribution to improvement, rather than corroborating the rightfully taken for granted. In 
forensic studies, however, following failure, disentangling the specific unanticipated failure 
from the rightfully taken-for-granted can be difficult, as in the case of the crashing Comets.
It is sobering to contrast the CMO theory-focused and theory-testing evaluation of the 
Comet crashes with the theory-specification and testing indifference of the meta-analysis of 
Scared Straight (Petrosino et al, 2002), which found that criminality seemed to be produced 
rather than reduced. The systematic review included a) no analysis of points where the scared 
straight theory might be wanting; b) no proposals for or tests of alternative theory that might 
explain the negative effects; and c) no findings identifying the sub-groups where mechanisms 
were activated to produce negative effects. Little is learned except that programmes like 
Scared Straight had produced some net negative effects where RCTs had been undertaken.
The Scared Straight meta-analysis can be contrasted with an article that begins with an 
RCT, as do the evaluations collected together in the Scared Straight review, but which tries to 
identify and diagnose long-term (23-year) subgroup negative side-effects by focusing on the 
mechanisms generating them in the social contexts of affected subgroup members. There are 
tacit CMO conjectures. Sherman and Harris (2015) identify higher long-term death rates 
among employed black victims of domestic violence, as compared to their non-black or unem-
ployed counterparts where the perpetrator was arrested rather than simply warned for misde-
meanor domestic violence.15 The conjectured mechanisms relates to post-traumatic stress 
(PTSS) occasioned by the arrest. A brief quote from Sherman and Harris’s article gives a fla-
vour of their proposed explanation:
The paradox (in the relationship between race, employment, and victims’ vulnerability to PTSS 
mediating their risk of death in response to arrest) would be present if there was greater resilience 
(and less PTSS) among black victims who were unemployed than among those who were employed, 
and if unemployed black victims also showed greater resilience than white victims whether they 
were employed or not. That paradox may relate to the extent to which employed African-American 
women, in particular, are more vulnerable to stress stemming from a threat to their livelihood or a 
change in their status and identity resulting from the threat of loss of employment, in comparison to 
unemployed women. The latter not only had no job to lose; many could also predictably depend on 
welfare benefits (such as aid for dependent children) for their financial support. Only a minority of 
women in Milwaukee’s concentrated poverty neighborhoods were employed ‘strivers,’ pursuing 
what Anderson (1999) calls a ‘decent’ code of conduct. They could reasonably have feared a far 
greater loss of status and respectability from their partner being arrested than most of the unemployed 
women, who had a different ‘code’ or self-defined identity unrelated to employment.
Sherman and Harris acknowledge that they lack a direct test for their conjectures, but the fol-
lowing accord well with the engineering approach outlined in the latter part of this article:
(1) the identification of a negative side effect;
(2) the attempted diagnosis of it; and
(3) recognition that the diagnosis needs empirical test.
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The implication would not necessarily be to abandon arrest as a response to misdemeanor 
domestic violence, but rather to tinker with it to try to maintain outcome benefits while avoid-
ing negative side-effects.
Conclusions
This article has proposed the following six main arguments.
First, evaluations should focus on meeting the evidence needs of policy, programme and 
practice decision-makers, even if that means crossing boundaries between what have often 
been seen as incommensurable methodologies.16
Second, EMMIE (Effect, Mechanism, Moderator/context, Implementation and Economy) 
comprise five major considerations for policy, programme and practice decision-makers in 
relation to which empirical evidence can play a crucial role. Hence, to be most informative for 
decision-makers those conducting evaluations and systematic reviews are advised to collect 
evidence relating to all of them. This comprises a pragmatic approach wherein the realist 
methods most relevant to contexts, mechanisms and outcome pattern configurations are mar-
ried to traditional PPP experimental methods used in most effect and economy studies and to 
qualitative methods that are often used to investigate implementation.
Third, evaluation might usefully model itself on engineering with its pragmatic focus on 
using any and all methods that help test crucial theories built into designs, especially those that 
are most likely to fail and lead to critical weaknesses in outcomes for some PPP participants. 
The choice of method is a matter of its fitness for the purpose of theory testing. And theory 
adequacy is likewise a pragmatic matter of fitness for purpose in delivering wanted outcomes 
in a cost-effective way. Engineering theories take the form of CMOs. Those of interest in 
practice are those most likely to fail. Moreover engineering is chronically concerned with 
overall success (Effect) and with achieving reliability (Implementation) and with achieving 
results within the resource limits available (Economy).
Fourth, the received wisdom suggesting that clinical trials/RCTs provide a gold standard for all 
other evaluations should be rejected. This is different from saying that there is no value in clinical 
trials. They have their place. A simple RCT can show only that a (well-targeted) measure can have 
an effect or that the measure does not always have its intended effect (although see Fletcher et al. 
and Hawkins, this issue, for a discussion of ways in which RCTs may be framed within realist 
evaluation). In health and medical research the RCT is one method among many that furnish evi-
dence in favour of or against decisions to recommend a given treatment to a given individual with 
a given problem. Clinical trials involving RCTs are normally undertaken once much other research, 
using quite other methods, has been conducted to establish that there are reasonable grounds for 
hoping that a given treatment will lead to benefits for a given population. Results can be used to 
inform questions about variations by subgroup and context. In engineering RCTs are rare. Evidence 
is mostly collected in other ways. These appear to have been important in leading to improvements 
in engineering in terms of cost, reliability, efficiency and adaptability to new settings.
Fifth, the social has sui generis properties that suggest that neither clinical trials nor engi-
neering methods can be taken off the shelf and applied with confidence that the findings will 
match the robustness expected from those methods when applied in medicine or technology. 
Issues of intentionality, reflexivity and complexity conspire to make the social a more fragile 
setting for interventions, albeit that there may be levels of abstraction at which robust, middle-
range and useable CMOCs can be identified.
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Sixth, and following Feyerabend, in terms of method ‘anything goes’, provided that it takes 
forward our understanding of what works for whom in what circumstances. Pragmatic consid-
erations trump methodological purity.
Towards cumulation
The Holy Grail for applied as well as pure science is cumulation. Over the medium-to-long 
term this is obvious in engineering and health. It is less clear in social programmes. This may 
partly be to do with the distinctiveness of the social mentioned in my fifth point above. It may 
also have to do with the failure of research and evaluation to follow the kind of sequencing 
found in engineering and clinical medicine where successive studies seem to build on and be 
orientated to earlier ones rather than undertaken from scratch by generic evaluation journey-
men. Figure 3 tries to represent cumulation as it has been achieved in clinical medicine and in 
engineering. It does not describe what occurs with PPPs. Perhaps it would be worth trying as 
a means of identifying and refining useable and portable CMOCs.
The left side of Figure 3 shows when an intervention fails in some respect (think of the 
crashing Comets). The failure is unpicked (think of the forensic examination of the Comet 
crashes and the tests of the hypotheses to explain the crashes). Abstraction from the failure 
occurs (think of the structural strains created by repeated pressurization/depressurization). 
Designs are modified to remedy the crucial weaknesses (think of the redesigned windows 
for the Comet). The right side of Figure 3 shows what happens where successes are achieved 
(think of the Wright brothers). Crucial features of success are identified and built into 
improved future designs (think the subsequent history of aeronautical engineering). Of 
course the two sides feed into one another as successes lead to extensions, which some-
times fail (the right to left feedback) and as failures lead to adaptations which sometimes 
succeed (the left to right feedback). The double feedback loops create increases in engi-
neering achievement. They depend less on discrete tries of bright ideas and more on prob-
lem-solving and research development where what happens now builds on what happened 
yesterday, to extend success and to identify and remedy failures. The process depends on 
close working relationships between decision-makers and applied scientists orientated to 
helping decision-makers avoid errors and achieve successes. It is, one imagines, what 
Popper meant by piecemeal social engineering and Campbell by the experimental society 
(Campbell and Rosso, 1999). It is this model that promises most for cumulation in devel-
oping PPPs.
The implications of the foregoing discussion for the ‘What Works’ movement may be quite 
profound. They include:
Figure 3. Processes of cumulation.
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•• moving away from pass/fail verdicts or simple net impact estimates;
•• concentrating heavily on identifying and diagnosing failures of and also within PPPs 
(even when the net effects appear positive);
•• using diverse methods to test embedded programme theories and assumptions for their 
weakest points before, during and after PPPs are put in place;
•• being explicit about causal mechanisms in successes and failures and the contexts 
needed for the activation and deactivation of those causal mechanisms;
•• extensive tinkering with PPPs in their targeting and delivery-on-the-ground once the 
core ideas have been worked out and even during their implementation;
•• an explicit agenda for adaptation and cumulation in PPP understanding to improve out-
comes; and
•• a continuing concern with best estimates of bottom-line economic effectiveness.
It will be difficult to overcome the ‘what works’ slogan itself even though it is freighted with 
misleading assumptions and expectations that cannot be met. However, evaluators and PPP 
decision-makers need to know better.
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Notes
 1. Of course matters are often a little more complex, for example with no treatment, placebo, and con-
ventional treatment often provided for one or more control group. The underlying logic, however, 
remains the same.
 2. For one influential example of an evidence hierarchy, the Maryland Scale, see Sherman (1997). For 
a discussion of standards and a review of some others, see Nutley et al. (2013).
 3. Systematic searches to find all studies that have the required methodological attributes are needed to 
avoid biases that may creep in if only those most readily available are drawn on. In particular a ‘pub-
lication bias’ towards intervention successes may occur if only those that are published are included.
 4. The question of whether RCTs and quasi-experiments can be conducted in realist terms is touched 
on but the detailed argument lies beyond the scope of this article. Other contributions to this spe-
cial issue discuss in different terms the possibility of making use of RCTs in the conduct of realist 
evaluations; see also Bonell et al. (2012, 2013) and Marchal et al. (2013).
 5. Rothwell rightly emphasizes the risks of post hoc subgroup analysis. This may take the form of 
fishing expeditions. If sufficient variables are tried with large samples statistically significant sub-
group variations will be expected as a matter of chance. This is not to say that trials cannot be 
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designed in advance to test for expected, theoretically informed subgroup variations or that appar-
ently significant findings from fishing expeditions should not lead to further research to determine 
if there is, indeed, a causal relationship.
 6. This heterogeneity problem continues in the meta-analyses of systematic reviews. A recent paper on 
trials has noted two ideal types, one of which is ‘explanatory’ and the other of which is ‘pragmatic’, 
although the authors note that these stand at opposite ends of a continuum (Loudon et al, 2015). 
Pragmatic trials attempt to assess the ‘real world’ effectiveness of an intervention to inform decision-
makers about its adoption. Explanatory trials use idealized settings to ‘give the initiative under evalu-
ation its best chance to demonstrate a beneficial impact’ (Loudon et al, 2015: 1). The authors note 
that few trials fit either ideal perfectly, and they have developed (‘with the help of’ 80 international 
trialists, clinicians and policymakers’) a tool to place trials at one of five points along the continuum. 
The distinctions they make and the problems in making them highlight the difficulty a) in determining 
what can be learnt from any given trial and b) in synthesizing a set of trials that sit at different points 
(or maybe mostly towards one end) in the continuum Loudon at al usefully identify.
 7. This statement could have been made by Pawson and Tilley and was made after their first sketch of 
realist evaluation, which appeared in quite an obscure edited collection (Pawson and Tilley, 1992). 
However, there is no reason to believe Lipsey and Wilson were drawing on Pawson and Tilley, to 
whom they make no reference.
 8. This may still be the case with many social interventions, where neither thought through theory 
nor relevant evidence of past effectiveness seem to lie behind them. In King and Crewe’s (2013) 
catalogue of catastrophes, the millennium dome and poll tax are examples. Other cases show well-
developed theory that evaluators can help formalize and test (see Tilley, 2015).
 9. For a (realist) discussion of rational decisions not to accept falsifying evidence, see Koslowski (1996), 
and for the need for fiddling with apparatus, contact with others who had succeeded and the tacit 
knowledge thereby gained in translating the possible into something that works, see Collins (1985).
10. A brief look at the curricula at other universities suggests that this is fairly typical. Some do include mod-
ules on experimental methods, but these relate mainly to the practicalities of testing and measurement.
11. Although not framed in these terms, this approach is exemplified in Syed (2015). Campbell, Syed 
and Vincenti all hark back to Popper as the inspiration for their writings on cumulative develop-
ments in science and engineering.
12. Campbell (1974: 435) interestingly notes that scientific progress often speeds up where discoveries 
such as the ‘barometer, microscope, telescope, galvanometer, cloud chamber, and chromatograph’ 
have made testing hypotheses easier. This speaks to the importance of taking advantage of diverse 
and emerging methods of testing PPP theories.
13. Gawande (2010) has made a similar point about engineering and the construction of skyscrapers 
where, notwithstanding initial designs, in the translation of blueprints on the ground tinkering is 
needed to overcome unanticipated problems. Gawande’s own account of the developments in sur-
gery checklists likewise shows the need for tinkering in a social programme.
14. Pragmatic is used here to mean, ‘for practical purposes’. It is not used to refer to philosophical 
pragmatism. See also note 16.
15. Some readers may suspect homicide. This was not the case.
16. For a more extensive (and realist-related) discussion of the focus of research aiming to inform 
improvements in policy, programme and practice, focusing on crime but with general implications, 
see Tilley (2016). Wider debates on use and usability are, however, complex and lie beyond the 
remit of that chapter or this article.
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